

~~SECRET~~

Executive Registry
78-9321

12 JUN 1978

*MFP*

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Debrief of Testimony before the Senate Foreign  
Relations Committee, 9 June 1978

1. Presented the same presentation as yesterday before the House International Relations Committee.
2. There was a substantial discussion at the beginning of the hearing with regard to whether we could get away with producing documentation only to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. There was great opposition to this. After many Senators had declaimed on the subject, I was able to make the following points:
  - a. No Member of Congress had ever asked me to identify the name of a human intelligence source.
  - b. What we were dealing with here was how close to such identification we were going to get in the information that we were providing to the Congress. This was not a black and white issue, it was one of deciding where the cutoff would be between not revealing the name of a source and revealing the product of intelligence.
  - c. I stated that we were always willing to provide the product.
3. Senator Church asked me for the story to which I referred in my opening remarks (from the San Francisco Chronicle) in which it was indicated that a source close to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had disclosed Secret intelligence. I want to be sure to send him that. (DCI has drafted.)

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

E2 IMPDET

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2004/07/29 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000600320126-2

2

5. Senator Church made a point that the internal situation in Zaire was very bad economically, politically, and with respect to corruption.

6. Senator Pell indicated he wasn't convinced.

7. Senator McGovern referred to a classified State Department report of the chief of our interest section in Havana's conversations with Castro and wondered why this hadn't been made public. He wondered why Castro would lie so resolutely.

a. He quoted Andy Young from the morning paper with respect to the United States' responsibility to prevent its allies from providing arms to Savimbi if we're going to complain about the Cubans providing arms to the Katangans. Throughout this and other questioning, I acknowledged that Zaire was a point of transfer and supply for the various insurgent groups inside Angola. In this case, I pointed out there was a difference in that the Cubans were directly training the Katangans; we were not giving any support to Savimbi ourselves.

b. McGovern finally summed it up to say that there was "some evidence of Cuban involvement."

8. Senator Javits wanted to know if the Cubans were a more or less permanent element in the Angolan military situation. I said yes.

a. Javits wanted to be kept abreast of any impact that the arrival of an all-African force has on Cuban morale. He feels that when the Cubans know they are going to be up against a tougher fight they may not be so happy. (This seemed to ignore the fact that we didn't claim the Cubans were in Zaire.)

b. Javits wanted to know what our plans were to beam information into Cuba when things begin to turn sour for them. What plans do we have for a Radio Free Cuba? I'd like to check with State Department and see if we are today doing anything or have any plans there. Ask the covert action people to look into this.

9. Senator Church wanted to know if the "Cubans' claim that the people they were providing to Angola and Ethiopia were volunteers." I said I could not answer that but would. (DCI has drafted a reply.)

The question of the number of Cuban casualties has come up--I've said 1200 in Angola, and some lesser number in Ethiopia. I'd like any more hard facts we have on that.

10. Senator Clark wanted to know why it was wrong for "Cubans to do what they've done." I tried to take the Fifth Amendment.

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2004/07/29 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000600320126-2

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/07/29 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000600320126-2

3

a. Senator Clark wanted to know why we didn't have any "concrete" evidence.

b. He wanted to know whether the weapons that they used were identical to the Cuban weapons.

11. In addition, Clark quoted from the SSCI report to the effect that there was "no concrete evidence of Cuban planning of this operation," but that Admiral Turner had indicated that he had one more report coming which has not been shown to them on this subject. I denied having an additional report or having promised same to the SSCI.

12. Clark wanted to know what evidence there was of East German participation. I told him there was one report from our non-European diplomat in Europe. He then quoted Brzezinski to say there was lots of evidence of East German participation. I then said I remembered that Brzezinski and I had discussed this and Brzezinski showed me that there were two or three of our reports that all discussed East German participation.

Clark said the evidence was all circumstantial but convincing.

25X1

14. Church wanted an in-depth study of what US policy ought to be in light of these events.

15. Clark wanted to know about Kaunda's role and why he said the United States was preoccupied with the Cuban role in this when it was really an internal problem. I replied that I thought Kaunda wanted very much to keep the major powers out of the problems on both of his borders.

a. Clark wanted to know whether the attempted overthrow of Neto by Alves was inspired and supported by the Russians. I said we thought not.

b. Clark and Church both asked about Somalis' support for the insurgency in the Ogaden today. I took the position there was insurgency. We had circumstantial but not good evidence that the Somalis were providing support.


~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/07/29 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000600320126-2

~~SECRET~~

16. Clark and Church remained after the hearing ended. Both had considerable points to make about the inevitability of the Soviets taking advantage of opportunities such as these and yet the long-term strength of the United States.

25X1



~~STANSFIELD TURNER~~  
Director

~~SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/29 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000600320126-2

Approved For Release 2004/07/29 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000600320126-2

78-15291/1

OLC 78-2016  
12 June 1978

MR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: Acting Legislative Counsel  
SUBJECT: Lunch with Senator Alan Cranston's (D., Calif.)  
SALT Group on Tuesday, 13 June 1978

1. Action Requested: None; for information only.


2. Background: Per your memorandum of conversation dated 25 May 1978, and in coordination with your office, we have confirmed with Senator Cranston's office that you will attend a lunch on 13 June 1978 in Room S-148 of the Capitol. The following people have been invited to attend:

Senator Birch Bayh (D., Ind.)  
Senator Dale Bumpers (D., Ark.)  
Senator John Chafee (R., R.I.)  
Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho)  
Senator Dick Clark (D., Iowa)  
Senator John Culver (D., Iowa)  
Senator John Glenn (D., Ohio)  
Senator Gary Hart (D., Colo.)  
Senator Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.)  
Senator Thomas McIntyre (D., N.H.)  
Senator Edmund Muskie (D., Maine)  
Senator Claiborne Pell (D., R.I.)  
Senator Charles Percy (R., Ill.)  
Senator Robert Stafford (R., Vt.)

X1

Also invited is Mr. Larry Smith, Senate Armed Services Committee staff who has [redacted]. We found it necessary to exclude members of Senator Cranston's personal staff on the basis of our policy on staff access to compartmented information. We anticipate no problem from Senator Cranston but you should know that this occurred against the unlikely possibility he raises it.

STAT



Attachment:  
Biographic cards

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/07/29 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000600320126-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/07/29 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000600320126-2

LC

OLC #78-2016
Executive Record
78-1591

25 MAY 1978

MR


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of Defense  
24 May 1978

13. We discussed Senator Cranston's desire to meet with us on SALT. Secretary Brown can't do it on the 13th of June. Cranston had told me that he would go ahead with me even if Harold couldn't make it; nonetheless, I'd like to have someone check with Cranston's office and see if that is still the case or would they like to wait and get us both at the same time. I would much prefer to go in duo.

14. I told him the Senate Select Committee was pushing hard for identification of the 62 spaces for the NITC/RM. He told Secretary Duncan we had to get on with it.

STAT

  
J. STANSFIELD TURNER  
Director

SECRET